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Are Sexes Natural Kinds?1 
 
1. What are natural kinds? 
We classify biological organisms into many categories.  Most obviously, we sort them into 
species (e.g. the common fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster).  We also group them into higher 
phylogenetic taxa, such as genera (e.g. Drosophila), families (e.g. Drosophilidae), orders (e.g. 
Diptera), classes (e.g. Insecta), and so on.  There are plenty of other biological categories 
besides, which do not correspond either to species or to higher taxa, such as herbivore and 
carnivore, viviparous and oviparous, larva, pupa, and imago, nocturnal and diurnal, altricial and 
precocial, and male and female, among others.  On what basis do we make these 
classifications?  The short answer is similarity, but as many philosophers have pointed out, 
similarity is subjective and is not amenable to strict criteria (Quine 1969).  In some sense, 
everything is similar to everything else. 
A more promising answer is that we categorize individuals on the basis of shared 
properties, though that answer is also not without its problems.  One deep philosophical puzzle 
concerns what to count as a property.  We can conjure up negative properties (e.g. non-green), 
disjunctive properties (e.g. green or blue), and convoluted properties (e.g. green if examined 
before the year 2100, blue otherwise).  But these do not seem like genuine properties, though it 
is a challenge to spell out what disqualifies them as serious contenders.  Setting aside such 
philosophical puzzles about the nature of properties, we can say that observable or measurable 
properties of individuals are generally the basis for classifying them into categories, and that 
classification is indispensable for understanding the world, including the biological world.  
Without categories, we might conceive of the world only as a series of individuals and we would 
be hard pressed to make generalizations across individuals or propose systematic laws or 
theories. 
Classification is central to many of our endeavors, including law, religion, and sports, but 
science is undeniably the enterprise with the most elaborate systems of categories, and most of 
them work impressively well for explaining and predicting various things.  Scientists group 																																																								
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things into a multitude of categories and these classification schemes or taxonomic systems 
serve as the basis for scientific theorizing.  As philosophers have long pointed out, some of 
these classification schemes seem less “natural” than others, at least with hindsight.  The 
nineteenth-century philosopher of science William Whewell noted that a classification of plants 
on the basis of the numbers of pistils and stamens in their flowers, was “artificial,” not natural 
(1847, 489-490).  His reason appears to be that this classification does not reveal any other 
similarities among the plants and it does not enable us to make significant generalizations (e.g. 
All plants with two stamens are…).  It is a classification that does not do any work for us and, as 
such, has been discarded as science has progressed.  The classifications that remain tend to be 
those that can be used successfully in inductive inferences and enable us to explain many 
features of the individuals classified.  The reason that they are so successful is that they are 
based on properties that reliably indicate the presence of numerous other properties.  If I 
classify a plant as an angiosperm (or flowering plant), I can infer that its stamens will have two 
pairs of pollen sacs, that the seeds will be enclosed within an endosperm, which is a nutritive 
tissue that provides food for the embryo, and so on.  These generalizations enable us to make 
reliable predictions, for example, that if a hitherto unidentified plant is an angiosperm, its seeds 
will be enclosed within an endosperm, among other things.  That provides a stark contrast from 
a classification based on the number of pistils or stamens, which does not enable us to make 
any generalizations or inferences.  That is why categorization into angiosperms and 
gymnosperms persists in scientific practice, while classification on the basis of the number of 
stamens does not.  We could say, following Whewell, that the successful classification schemes 
are the “natural” ones and are likely to persist. 
It would be good to pause here and consider whether this classification is not merely 
predictive but also genuinely explanatory.  Suppose you ask for an explanation of the fact that 
some plants have seeds enclosed within an endosperm, and I respond by saying that there is a 
simple explanation, namely that they are angiosperms.  Have I really explained that fact?  There 
may be contexts in which that would be considered an explanation, but there are surely others 
in which it would be a cop-out.  As an explanation, it does not seem to go nearly far enough.  
One thing missing from this explanation is an account of why these plants have this property.  A 
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more complete explanation would surely be that it is because they are descended from other 
plants that have this same property and that this property was selected for over a very long 
period of time because of its adaptive advantage to the plants, in accordance with Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection.2  According to that theory, heritable variations in individual 
organisms that offer an adaptive advantage will tend to be transmitted to the next generation 
and preserved.  There are two features of this explanation that deserve expanding.  The first is 
its reference to a history of descent.  Because natural selection, and the theory of evolution 
more generally, explains current properties of individuals based on the properties of their 
precursors, we often classify individuals in biology on the basis of a common history.  Members 
of any given species are all thought to be descended from the same ancestors, and that is what 
explains why they have so many shared properties.  Moreover, properties in the biological 
realm tend to be shared for a reason, namely their causal efficacy in survival and reproduction.  
Thus, a fuller explanation in this case would refer to the fact that all angiosperms are 
descended from ancestors that had this property and that the property itself was presumably 
instrumental to the survival of those ancestors.  Indeed, this is the basis of the classification of 
plants into angiosperms and gymnosperms, not merely their causal properties but their etiology 
or causal history.  Bearing all that in mind, it does seem as though classification can be 
explanatory when we supply the entire basis for placing an individual into a particular category, 
not just the category label. 
A question that often arises is, just because some classifications are useful for explaining 
and predicting phenomena, can we conclude that they correspond to real divisions in nature?  
Or to put it more philosophically, can we go from an epistemological distinction (explanatory 
and predictive category) to a metaphysical one (natural kind)?  One thing to say in response is 
that if our scientific inquiries do not reveal which categories correspond to nature’s own kinds, 
then it is not clear how else we would go about determining that.  Even though our current 
scientific categories may not be the definitive ones, science seems to our best bet for isolating 
natural kinds.  Nevertheless, some philosophers tend be more restrictive, distinguishing 																																																								
2 This is not meant to imply that all persistent biological traits are adaptive, since some traits 
are transmitted across generations for other reasons. 
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between those scientific categories that are merely useful and those that correspond to natural 
kinds.  For them, a natural kind must have an essence or essential property, and categories that 
do not group things together on the basis of a shared essence do not correspond to natural 
kinds.  But essences are not easy to come by in the natural world, especially in biology.  
Essences are supposed to be properties that are linked to kinds by way of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, but there are few if any such strict links in the biological realm.  It was 
once thought that being a member of a species would be a matter of having a certain 
combination of genes, so that any individual who had those genes would be a member of some 
species S and no individual could be a member of species S unless it had that specific 
combination of genes. But things turn out to be far more complicated: there is no unique set of 
genes that is both necessary and sufficient for being a member of any particular species.  
Essences are also thought to be intrinsic, but at least some biological properties are relational 
or extrinsic.3  Finally, essences are commonly posited to be microstructural, but many biological 
properties are not.  So the essentialist approach is not promising, at least when it comes to 
many biological properties and kinds. 
 A more auspicious approach is the theory that natural kinds are homeostatic property 
clusters (HPC) (Boyd 1989).  The gist of this account is that properties cluster together reliably 
because they tend to be kept in a state of equilibrium (homeostasis) by a causal mechanism 
that ensures this.  This theory accords better with some biological kinds, but it may also be too 
constraining in this context, since biological kinds are often in flux and do not persist in a state 
of equilibrium for long.4  Moreover, there is not always a single causal mechanism that 
generates the properties associated with a given biological kind (as we already saw in the case 
of species not being identifiable with a unique genotype).  However, on a more liberal account 
of what natural kinds are, some loose combinations of properties tend to cause the 
instantiation of other properties, and these property clusters, which remain relatively stable 																																																								
3 As we saw, members of a species are classified together based on their common origin, which 
is an extrinsic property.  Some essentialists allow for extrinsic essences and argue that members 
of a species share a historical essence (e.g. Griffiths (1999)), while other essentialists deny this 
and maintain that members of a species share an intrinsic essence (e.g. Devitt (2008)). 
4 For a critique of HPC theory as applied to species, see Ereshefsky and Matthen (2005). 
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over time, are what we designate as natural kinds.  Individuals that have these properties are 
categorized together, and the usefulness of the categories stems from the fact that the 
properties cluster together reliably, not by accident but due to causal connections between 
them.  On a “simple causal theory” of natural kinds, they correspond to clusters of properties 
that are causally linked to other properties (Craver 2009; Khalidi 2013).  Thus, when we observe 
that one individual has some subset of these properties we can infer that it is likely to have the 
others.  In other words, the epistemic utility of the categories is grounded in the causal 
clustering of the properties.  In what follows, I will be operating with this more permissive 
understanding of natural kinds, in order to examine the plausibility of regarding the sexes, 
female and male, as natural kinds. 
 As already seen, members of biological kinds are often grouped together due to a 
shared history of descent.  This is true particularly of the higher taxa (e.g. genera, classes, 
orders, etc.).  The order Insecta corresponds roughly to the common category insect, and every 
schoolchild knows that all insects have six legs, a three-part body (head, thorax, abdomen), 
compound eyes, and two antennae.  But many biologists would say that they are classified 
together not just because of their shared causal properties, but primarily on the basis of having 
the same origin.  Like many other biological kinds, they can be considered at once causal kinds, 
grouped together on the basis of shared properties, and etiological kinds, grouped together on 
the basis of a common causal history.  Along these lines, Millikan has observed that many 
natural kinds in biology are “copied kinds”; members of these kinds share properties because 
they have been copied from a common template, and those properties are likely to be copied 
for a reason.  Millikan (2005, 307–308) associates three features with individual members of 
copied kinds: (1) all members have been produced from one another or from the same models; 
(2) members have been produced by, in, or in response to, the same ongoing historical 
environment (including other copied kinds); (3) some “function” is served by members of the 
kind, where “function” is roughly an effect raising the probability that its cause will be 
reproduced.  She also indicates that (1) is the primary characteristic of copied kinds, while (2) 
and (3) support it.  Many biological kinds can be considered copied kinds in this sense.  For 
instance, members of a biological species are descendants of the same ancestral population, 
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they are produced in response to the same or a similar environment, and the production of one 
member raises the probability of the production of others.  Hence, they are individuated 
primarily by their etiology or causal history, but they also share many causal properties 
(morphology, behavior, and so on) as a result of that common history and the copying process 
that it involves.  Copied kinds constitute a particular type of natural kind, which are 
individuated both by their synchronic causal properties and their causal history (etiology).  
Moreover, copied kinds are special because classification by causal properties and causal 
history tend to converge on the same individual members.  (Sometimes individuals grouped 
together based on a shared causal history have few if any causal properties in common.) 
 
2. A sex primer 
One way of approaching the question as to whether sexes are natural kinds is by asking 
whether the categories female and male are on a par with highly efficacious biological 
categories like species categories (e.g. Drosophila melanogaster), or whether the distinction 
between the sexes is more like the “artificial” distinction between plants based on the number 
of stamens and pistils, which was mentioned in section 1.  To address this question, it will be 
necessary to look more closely at the classification of organisms into female and male.  To 
simplify matters and for reasons that will be explained in section 3, I will restrict the discussion 
to animals, setting aside the plant kingdom for the time being.  
Many animal species exhibit polymorphisms, whereby there are several distinct types 
within the species.  In many social insects like ants and bees, there are different castes, such as 
workers, soldiers, and queens, and indeed, in some species there are different types of workers 
(all of whom are female).  These are perhaps the most striking polymorphisms in the animal 
kingdom, though there are numerous others.  Some polymorphisms arise as a result of genetic 
factors but others are due to environmental ones, as when queen bees are differentiated from 
workers as a result of diet.  The most familiar polymorphism is the dimorphism associated with 
sexual reproduction, which occurs in a wide variety of species across the animal kingdom.  In 
English, the word “sex” can refer to the activity or process of reproduction as well as to the 
distinction among two types of organism, and while the two phenomena are closely linked, 
 7 
they need to be distinguished.  The sex differences that are found within many species are 
related to the existence of sexual reproduction.  Living things originally reproduced asexually, as 
many organisms still do (e.g. bacteria, many plants, and a few species of animals).  Sexual 
reproduction was a later innovation and there are many theories as to why it arose.  It has 
some apparent advantages, since mixing genetic material in every generation has the potential 
to yield new alleles (alternative forms of the same gene) and new combinations of alleles, and 
some of these may have adaptive value.  But it also has some disadvantages, such as decreased 
efficiency owing to the fact that every act of reproduction takes two individuals, not just one 
(setting aside self-fertilizing hermaphrodites).  It is still a subject of lively scientific debate as to 
why sexual reproduction arose and what its pros and cons are, but we can say something about 
sexual dimorphism without settling that question.5 
 In principle, the evolution of sexual reproduction does not necessitate the evolution of 
two and only two sexual morphs, and it does not entail that these two morphs correspond to 
what we commonly label “female” and “male.”  In many sexually reproducing species, there are 
hermaphroditic individuals, which can be considered both female and male (or neither), and 
some species are entirely hermaphroditic.  In these species, there is only one morph, even 
though individuals reproduce sexually.  Banana slugs are a hermaphroditic species in which any 
individual can mate with any other, and in the absence of a partner, individual slugs can self-
fertilize.  In other species, there are more than two morphs, with different sex roles when it 
comes to courtship, mating, reproduction, child-rearing, and related functions (about which 
more later).  Having said that, most animal species that reproduce sexually are sexually 
dimorphic, comprising just two distinct morphs.  In sexually dimorphic species, one of the two 
morphs is usually labeled “female” and the other “male.”  But given the vast diversity among 
living beings, what justifies the neat classification into female and male across species?  Are 
there any recurrent objective differences that would warrant applying the same two labels in 
different species, and if so, what are the properties that constitute the basis for this distinction? 																																																								
5 Some biologists have argued that sexual reproduction is more advantageous in changing 
environmental conditions and less advantageous in relatively stable conditions (e.g. Otto 2008).  
There is also some uncertainty as to whether sexual reproduction evolved only once among 
living creatures or whether it arose more than once. 
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At first blush, one might think that females and males are distinguished primarily by their sexual 
organs, but there are some species in which the female has a “penis” or the male has a “vagina” 
(or as one might expect, both).  In Neotrogla cave insects, the penis-like female organ, called a 
“gynosome,” is used to suck out sperm and nutritious seminal fluids from the male, which has a 
vagina-like opening in its body.  Closer to home, among mammals, the female spotted hyena 
has a structure like a penis, which is used in mating.   
More fundamental than the sexual organs are the two cells (gametes) that combine 
together to form a fertilized cell (zygote) in sexually reproducing species.  The vast majority of 
sexually reproducing species are anisogamous, which means that the gametes come in two 
varieties and are produced by two types of organs called “gonads,” which are the ovaries and 
testes.  In these species, each of the two morphs has one type of gonad (ovaries or testes) and 
contributes a distinct type of gamete (ovum or sperm), which fuse together to produce a single 
zygote that combines genetic material from two parent organisms.  In these species, one of the 
two types of gametes (ovum) is much larger than the other (sperm).  While each gamete 
contains half the genetic material of the parent, the ovum is also resource-rich, providing 
nutrients for the embryo.  Biologists label the morph that produces the larger gamete, female, 
and the morph that produces the smaller one, male.  Thus, the basis of the female-male 
distinction in animals is the relative size of the gametes and the type of gonads that produce 
them.  What remains to be seen is whether this distinction marks an important difference 
between two morphs across all these sexually reproducing species, and whether it serves as the 
basis of a “natural” classification scheme.6  
Building on the discussion in the previous section, one way to go about addressing this 
issue is by determining whether the properties associated with these morphs (namely, their 
relative gamete size) correlate with any other differences, and whether they enable us to 
																																																								
6 It is not entirely clear why the gametes evolved such different properties in the first place.  But 
it might be adaptive to specialize, with one gamete containing nourishment for the embryo as 
well as genetic material, while the other just contains genetic material.  A recent collection of 
articles on the subject states: “The evolution of anisogamy, one of the major evolutionary 
riddles to remain unsolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emerges into the twenty-
first century as potent a mystery as ever” (Togashi & Cox 2011, 4). 
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explain and predict a number of other properties besides.  At least since Darwin, there has been 
a common view among evolutionary biologists that the disparity in the relative size of the 
gametes in sexually reproducing species causes numerous other differences in females and 
males across many species.  As Darwin emphasized, sexual selection is a variant of natural 
selection applied to traits that are particularly advantageous with regard to sexual reproduction 
(rather than mere survival).7  In the Descent of Man, Darwin attempted to explain how gamete 
size might lead to different traits among males and females in many species.  He reasoned that 
the larger gamete is not easily transportable, while the smaller gamete is more mobile (and 
indeed, often equipped with flagella that enable it to travel significant distances).  The smaller 
gamete usually needs to migrate towards the larger one so that fertilization can take place.  
This means that, especially in the “lowly-organised animals,” where fertilization is external to 
the body, it is advantageous to the male to “acquire the habit of approaching the female as 
closely as possible,” and this habit has been preserved in other species, even where fertilization 
is internal (Darwin 1871/1981, 274).  Therefore, according to Darwin, across a wide range of 
species, the small-gamete-producer (male) is more prone to seek out and pursue the large-
gamete-producer (female), which is to say that there are different behavioral dispositions in 
males and females in these species.   
Nowadays, this explanation is not widely accepted, since a male’s approaching the ova is 
not the same as pursuing the female, and anyway, it is unlikely that such a trait would persist in 
taxa in which it is no longer clearly advantageous due to internal fertilization.  More recent 
evolutionary biologists have focused, not so much on the differences in mobility among the 
differently sized gametes, but the varying amounts of effort that it takes to produce them.  
Since female gametes are large and rich in resources, they require a sizeable investment of time 
and energy to produce, while male gametes are small and do not require as much.  Hence, 
males can afford to produce many gametes and attempt to fertilize as many female gametes as 
possible, whereas females can only produce a small number and, given their investment, need 
																																																								
7 Prum (2017) defends the view, which he traces to Darwin’s later work, that sexual selection is 
not just the “handmaiden” of natural selection, but a separate type of process, which depends 
largely on aesthetic appeal rather than adaptiveness. 
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to ensure that they are fertilized by males with advantageous genes, resulting in a need for 
greater selectivity.8  This difference is posited to lead to different pre-mating and post-mating 
behaviors, leading females to be more selective in their mating habits, males to compete more 
intensely with other males for reproductive opportunities, and females to invest more 
resources in parental care.  Another difference that is sometimes cited is that in many species in 
which fertilization is internal rather than external, the female, which contributes the larger 
gamete, also carries the fertilized zygote, which means that females put even more investment 
in child-bearing and child-rearing, leading to differential mating strategies and parenting 
behavior.  Also, in these species, there is uncertainty about paternity due to the fact that sperm 
from different males can compete internally to fertilize the ova.  This means that females tend 
to have greater assurance than males as to which offspring are theirs, which implies that the 
former are more likely to invest in parental care than the latter.9 
For many evolutionary biologists, the relative size of female and male gametes is the 
causal factor that accounts for different morphologies, mating strategies, parenting behaviors, 
and other properties of females and males.  The size differential among the gametes means 
that the larger gamete tends to be less mobile, more scarce, and require greater resources than 
the smaller gamete.  Moreover, in the case of internal fertilization, the zygote tends to remain 
within the parent that contributes the larger gamete, thus providing less assurance of paternity 
for the other parent.  Males tend to acquire greater strength and natural weapons to compete 
against other males, as well as forms of ornamentation to attract females.  For females, it is an 
advantage to develop morphological and behavioral characteristics that aid in protecting and 
caring for offspring.  Though these properties are not universally found in all animal species, the 
causal link between relative gamete size and a number of other properties, which are in turn 
causally linked to yet other properties, accounts for observed morphological and behavioral 
																																																								
8 An influential version of this argument was given in Trivers (1972), relying partly on work by 
Bateman (1948).  But the argument has been criticized on various counts, see e.g. Kokko and 
Jennions (2008). 
9 The claim is not that organisms engage in these behaviors consciously, but that they acquire 
behavioral dispositions that tend to be transmitted genetically, epigenetically, and via learning 
mechanisms, because they are adaptive. 
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differences among the morphs that contribute the two types of gametes.10  If these theories are 
right, then the classification of organisms into female and male across a range of animal species 
really does serve as the basis for a “natural” rather than an “artificial” classification scheme (in 
Whewell’s terms).  Moreover, in accordance with the “simple causal theory” of natural kinds, 
possession of the different types of gonads that produce differently sized gametes is the causal 
property that brings about a number of other morphological and behavioral traits across a 
range of animal species.  If these speculations are correct, the sexes can therefore be 
considered to be natural kinds.11 
The sexes also seem to be etiological kinds and copied kinds (in Millikan’s sense).  Not 
only do females share causal properties with other females and males with other males, they 
are also reproduced from other females and males.  However, they are not straightforward 
copied kinds, since it is obviously not the case that females only produce females and males 
only males (indeed, the whole point is that it takes one of each sex to produce one of either 
sex).12  Nevertheless, all anisogamous animal species, those featuring dissimilar gametes, are 
likely descendants of the same anisogamous ancestors, so the presence of unequal gametes in 
a wide range of species has the same origin, as do the female and male morphs that produce 
them.  Hence, female and male organisms are individuated across different species as a result 																																																								
10 The causal links between gamete size and these other properties are not direct and proximal; 
rather, these properties come to be associated with each of the two morphs as a result of 
selection pressures over many generations.  For example, members of the small-gamete-
producing morph who have natural weapons tend to compete successfully for access to 
reproductive opportunities, which causes them to have more offspring, which in turn causes 
the trait to spread in that morph in the population.  For a classic statement of the distinction 
between proximate and ultimate causes in a biological context, see Mayr (1961). 
11 It may be tempting to think of female and male as HPC kinds rather than simple causal kinds, 
with a causal mechanism that keeps the respective clusters of properties in equilibrium.  But 
though it used to be thought that there was a single master gene, SRY, on the Y chromosome 
that controlled gonadal differentiation in many mammals, it turns out that matters are far more 
complex (Roughgarden 2013, 197-199; Ainsworth 2015, 298).  Moreover, the genetic 
mechanisms are very different in many other animals, for example reptiles and birds. 
12 Richardson (2010, 836) considers females and males to be “dyadic kinds” on the grounds that 
“sexes are not autonomous, individual classes, but interdependent, permanently coupled, 
interacting, binary subclasses of species…”  In this respect they are different from other 
biological kinds such as species, yet she still considers them to be natural kinds. 
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of having arisen from the same causal process (partly due to a common environment and 
similar selective pressures).13 
 
3. Challenges to sexes as natural kinds 
The case was made in the previous section that females and males can be considered to be 
natural kinds across animal species, both on the grounds that they share causal properties, as 
well as on the grounds that they are descended from the same ancestral types by means of a 
copying process.  But this case is open to a number of objections, some of which will be 
considered briefly in this section. 
 The first objection points to the fact that there are some sexually reproducing species in 
which there are more than just two sexual morphs, including “masculine females” and 
“feminine males” (Roughgarden 2013).  Rather than sexual dimorphism, these species can be 
said to exhibit sexual polymorphism (as mentioned in section 2), when it comes to morphology 
and to mating and parenting behaviors.  But there are two responses that can be made when 
faced with such phenomena.  One is to count them as exceptions that do not completely 
undermine the basis for considering females and males to be natural kinds.  After all, 
generalizations in biology are rarely if ever ironclad, and so we should not expect 
generalizations about biological natural kinds like female and male to be universal among 
sexually reproducing animals.  The other response is to say that species with multiple morphs 
do not constitute an exception at all, since the additional morphs appear to be sub-kinds of the 
kinds female and male.  Indeed, labels like “masculine female” and “feminine male” tend to 
reinforce this conjecture, since they seem to assume that these morphs are sub-kinds of 
females and males respectively, rather than altogether different kinds.  And just as the 
existence of the kind Drosophila melanogaster (species) does not undermine the existence of 
the kind Drosophila (genus), the existence of subordinate sexual kinds does not count against 
the existence of the superordinate kinds female and male. 
 Perhaps the most powerful objection to female and male being natural kinds is that the 
morphological and behavioral properties associated with gamete size are far more variable 																																																								
13 Franklin-Hall (this volume) argues for a view of this kind. 
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across animal species than was acknowledged in the previous section, thereby undermining the 
very basis of the distinction (cf. Dupré 1986).  According to some researchers, the causal 
pathways from relative gamete size to morphological differences, mating strategies, parental 
investment, and so on, are too diverse to ground any useful generalizations.  For instance, 
though it is true that the morph producing smaller gametes tends to be more competitive in 
many species, this assumes a roughly equal sex ratio.  But if males are, for some reason, much 
scarcer than females in a species or population, then they will tend to be less competitive than 
females.  Similarly, even if females tend to invest more resources in parenting in many species, 
this obtains when offspring need care, but in precocial species, ones in which the young are 
relatively independent, females do not need to provide parental care.  Once all such exceptions 
are taken into account, a critic might say, it will be clear that there is no clustering of properties 
associated with large and small gamete producers respectively, thereby undermining the 
presumed naturalness of the kinds, female and male.   
 The strength of this objection depends largely on the empirical evidence and the extent 
to which generalizations concerning females and males are manifested across a wide range of 
species.  Biologists themselves seem divided over the scope of these generalizations and their 
utility.  But the preponderance of evidence currently suggests that there are some important 
and interesting generalizations that hold across a wide variety of species, and moreover that 
some of these differences evolved independently in separate lineages (e.g. relative size of 
females and males, male ornamentation, courtship displays by males, and parental care by 
females).  Moreover, even though these generalizations may be riddled with exceptions, that is 
because there are other causal factors that intervene, interacting with gamete size to issue in a 
range of effects.  It is not that female and male do not represent important causal properties, 
but they interact with other causal factors in such ways as to lead to somewhat different 
outcomes in different species, populations, or even environmental circumstances.  This means 
that some generalizations only hold within more restricted domains.  Even those biologists who 
are somewhat skeptical that many generalizations can be made about females and males across 
all animal species acknowledge, for instance, that there is a “mammal model” of female-only 
care for offspring, and an “avian model” of biparental care (e.g. Kokko & Jennions 2008).  This 
 14 
suggests that at least some generalizations about females and males hold within taxa like 
mammals or birds, rather than across all taxa.  This would not be a vindication of the claim that 
female and male are natural kinds, but it would give support to the view that female-bird, male-
mammal, and so on, are.  Thus, even if it turns out that female and male are not natural kinds 
across animal species, they may enter into subordinate natural kinds within certain taxa.14   
 There are other objections to the view that the sexes are natural kinds, which may be 
worth considering in brief.  It was already mentioned that some individuals, and indeed entire 
species, are hermaphroditic, combining both female and male gonads and sex organs in the 
same organism.  If we were to consider these organisms both female and male, it may be 
objected that female and male cannot be natural kinds, since one mark of a natural kind 
distinction is that no individual can simultaneously be a member of two natural kinds.  But that 
does not necessarily rule them out as natural kinds, it would just mean that female and male 
are not mutually exclusive kinds.  Moreover, it may be more plausible to consider such 
individuals to belong to neither kind rather than to both, which would defuse the objection 
entirely.  A related objection would refer to the fact that in some species, sex determination 
results primarily from environmental rather than genetic factors, such as temperature or 
population density, meaning that the same individual can be sequentially female and male.  
(This is referred to as sequential hermaphroditism, by contrast with simultaneous 
hermaphroditism.)  But that would not necessarily be a deal-breaker, since there are arguably 
other natural kinds such that individuals can belong sequentially to different kinds (e.g. atoms 
of chemical elements that undergo radioactive decay).  It may also be objected that femaleness 
and maleness constitute endpoints of a spectrum rather than two sides of a dichotomy, since in 
some species (e.g. humans) there are individuals who fall along a continuum between female 
and male.  “While male and female stand on the extreme ends of a continuum, there are many 
other bodies… that evidently mix together anatomical components conventionally attributed to 
both males and females” (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 31).  But this again would not disqualify them 
from being natural kinds, at least if we allow species to be natural kinds.  Species themselves 																																																								
14 This seems to be the view advocated by Dupré (1986), who makes a powerful case for not 
considering female and male to be natural kinds across animal species. 
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evolve from other species and there are often individuals intermediate between distinct 
species, at least around the time of speciation events.  Finally, it may be said that female and 
male crosscut other natural kinds such as species, in the sense that individuals a and b can both 
be members of species S, and individuals b and c can both be members of the kind female, yet a 
and c may belong neither to the kind S nor the kind female (since a is male and c belongs to 
some other species S*).  But here again, it appears that many good candidates for natural kinds 
crosscut other natural kinds (Khalidi 1998). 
 One could also question the claim that that female and male are natural kinds in the 
sense of etiological kinds or copied kinds.  If it turns out that sexual reproduction or anisogamy 
evolved more than once in the animal kingdom, then the morphs female and male would not 
be copied kinds, since they would not all derive from the same templates.  But even so, they 
may yet be natural kinds on the basis of shared causal properties, just as long as we allow 
analogous biological structures to belong to the same kinds, such as wings and eyes, which 
evolved multiple times in different animal lineages, not just homologous ones like vertebrae or 
femurs, which have the same origin (Weiskopf 2011; Ereshefsky 2012). 
 Finally, this discussion of the sexes has been restricted to animals, mainly because it is 
difficult to make the case that (some) sexually reproducing plants also come in two sexual 
morphs, female and male.  While it is true that many plants are anisogamous and plant gametes 
also tend to occur in two varieties, one of which is larger than the other, individual plants tend 
to produce both gametes and generally self-fertilize as well as cross-fertilize.  Even in species 
where individual “female” and “male” plants exist, the fact that they are not mobile in the ways 
that animals are, means that the causal consequences of anisogamy are very different.  Without 
going into further detail, suffice it to say that there are few, if any, morphological (much less 
behavioral) commonalities among “female” plants and animals or among “male” plants and 
animals.  Hence, the claim being defended here is merely that female and male constitute 
natural kinds in the animal kingdom, not among all living organisms. 
 
4. Enough about sex, what about gender? 
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In the past several decades, it has become commonplace to distinguish sex from gender, and to 
say that sex is natural, while gender is social or “socially constructed.”  The first part of that 
claim would seem to accord with the argument being made here.  But this claim is also 
sometimes taken to imply that sex is real whereas gender is fictitious or imaginary.  However, a 
more plausible interpretation is that sex (the female-male distinction) is a kind that pertains to 
the biological domain, with causal links to biological phenomena, such as morphology, 
reproduction, hormones, secondary sexual characteristics, basic behavioral patterns, and so on.  
Meanwhile, gender (the feminine-masculine or woman-man distinction) is a kind that belongs 
to the social domain, with primary reference to the human species.  This means that gender 
categories feature mainly in explanations in the social sciences and the kinds woman and man 
pertain to those disciplines.  That does not mean that gender is not real, just that its causes and 
effects relate to the social world and social phenomena, such as employment, discrimination, 
exploitation, and so on.  This widespread viewpoint is lucidly expressed by Friedman (1996, 78): 
In the familiar terms of the sex/gender distinction, “sex” is the biologically given basis 
of sex identity and sexuality. Biological sex comprises external and internal genital 
anatomy, anatomically secondary sex-characteristics, and certain hormonal and 
chromosomal combinations. The words “female” and “male” identify persons in terms 
of their biologically sexed natures. Gender, by contrast, encompasses traits and 
behaviors which mark, and are traditionally thought to express, those biological givens 
in cultural practice. Gender includes psychological qualities, intellectual traits, social 
roles, grooming styles, and other modes of self-presentation. The words “feminine” 
and “masculine” identify persons in terms of their genders. 
Like some other social kinds, gender appears to have an underlying biological basis (with which 
it is often confused).  Though I have argued that sex is a real kind, gender depends in part on 
the perception of sex, so whether or not gender is real or not does not depend on whether sex 
is, since we often perceive what is not there.  (To compare, many biologists do not consider 
race to be a real biological kind, yet that does not rule out the possibility that race is a real 
social kind, which may depend on a mistaken perception of biological difference.)  Moreover, 
even though gender may be a real social kind in many societies in the present, due to a 
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widespread perception that biological differences among females and males have social 
implications, it may cease to be one in the future as the social consequences of biological sex 
diminish.  After all, humans are also categorized by biologists according to blood type, but this 
does not seem to have (and ought not to have) any social repercussions.  
 Some theorists have argued not only that gender is a social construction, but that sex is 
too (e.g. Fausto-Sterling 2000).  As I’ve already suggested, this is sometimes taken to mean that 
sex is fictitious or unreal, but that would be misguided, since it seems to assume that social 
phenomena are less real than biological ones.  However, it could more plausibly be taken to 
mean that sex, like gender, is primarily a social phenomenon and that we have misconstrued 
the nature of sex, mistakenly thinking that it pertains to biology when it doesn’t.  If that is right, 
then the argument that I have been making in this chapter, that sex is a biological natural kind, 
is wrong.  Since I have already presented some evidence to the contrary, I will not recapitulate 
it here.  Having said that, it may be true that we sometimes exaggerate the effects of sex and 
think that some properties are biologically based, when in fact they are a result of social 
processes.  Just because female and male are real biological kinds that does not mean that they 
are associated with a number of wide-ranging and unchangeable psychological or behavioral 
properties.  For example, it may be mistaken to think, as some researchers have, that there are 
cognitive differences associated with these kinds (cf. Fine 2010).  And even if there are such 
differences, they may be swamped by the effects of learning and culture to the point that they 
are negligible in the human species.  Hence, we should take the claim that sexes are natural 
kinds in the animal kingdom with a grain of salt; it does not imply that the biological differences 
among female and male humans do and should have social consequences, even though they 
have had such consequences in most societies for all of recorded history.  
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